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RAPE IN WARTIME:
REDRESS IN UNITED STATES COURTS
UNDER THE ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT
Susana SdCouto *
I. INTRODUCTION
The history of rape and violent sexual abuse of women
during armed conflict transcends religious, national, cultural,
ideological, and temporal boundaries. Women have been raped
intentionally, as a strategy of war, "in virtually all wars, by
almost all military forces."' Notorious examples of this strategy
of war have involved the rape of women on a massive scale.
Within the first two years of the conflict in the former
Yugoslavia, for example, estimates of the number of rape
victims ranged from 20,000 to 50,000. 2 Some of these women
*J.D. candidate, Northeastern University School of Law, 1998; M.A.L.D.,
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 1994; B.A., Brown University, 1990.
The author was an intern with the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia in the spring of 1998. She would like to especially thank
Nathaniel Berman and Judy Brown for their comments and assistance with this
article and the editorial staff of the NUForum for all of their fine work.
[Beth Stephens, The Civil Lawsuit as -a Remedy for International Human
Rights Violations Against Women, 5 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 143, 146 (1994)
(referencing discussion of rape in war in Susan Brownmiller, AGAINST OUR
WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE 31-113 (1975)). See also Christine Chinkin,
Rape and Sexual Abuse of Women in International Law, 5 EUR. J. INT'L L. 326,
327-28 (1994).
2See European Community Investigative Mission into the Treatment of Muslim
Women in the Former Yugoslavia, Warburton Report, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess.,
U.N. Doc. S/25240 (1993) (estimating 20,000 Bosnian Muslim victims of
rape); Andrew Bell-Fialkoff, A Brief History of Ethnic Cleansing, 72 FOREIGN
AFFAIRS 110 (1993) (noting that estimates of women raped in the former
Yugoslavia ranged from 30-50,000); Ex-Yugoslavia: Mass Rape, A Male Tool
of War, WIN NEWS, Winter 1993, at 42 (noting that by the winter of 1993, the
Bosnian government commission on war crimes in Sarajevo estimated 30,000
rape victims, while the Ministry for Foreign Affairs placed the total at 50,000).
Although there has been some controversy over the reliability of these
estimates, it is widely agreed that rape has occurred on a large scale in the
former Yugoslavia. See Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Special Rapporteur of the
Commission on Human Rights, Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the
Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Pursuant to Commission Resolution
RAPE IN WARTIME
were not only raped, but forced to bear the children of their
rapists.3  During the civil war and mass violence that racked
Rwanda for three months in the spring of 1994, hundreds of
thousands of women were reportedly raped or forced into sexual
servitude.4 Like the victims of rape in the former Yugoslavia,
some of these women were forced to carry their pregnancies to
term and give birth to unwanted children.5 During the August
1990 invasion of Kuwait, an estimated 5,000 Kuwaiti women
were raped by Iraqi soldiers. 6 As many as 200,000 to 400,000
women were raped by Pakistani soldiers during the nine-month
war after Bangladesh declared independence from Pakistan in
1971.7 And during the Second World War, an estimated
200,000 women were kidnapped, imprisoned in brothels known
as "comfort stations," and repeatedly raped by Japanese
soldiers.
8
Despite these and countless other examples of mass rape
during internal and international conflicts across the globe,
perpetrators of rape in armed conflict have rarely been brought
1992/S-1/1 of 14 August 1992, U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n on Human Rights, 49th
Sess., 86, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1993/50 (1993) (noting that although "it is not
possible at present to determine the number of victims of rape in this conflict..
. it is clear that there are large numbers involved.").
3See Christopher C. Joyner, Enforcing Human Rights Standards in the Former
Yugoslavia: The Case for an International War Crimes Tribunal, 22 DENV. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 235, 252 (1994) (noting that an estimated 1000 women were
impregnated as a result of rape). See also Third Report on War Crimes in the
Former Yugoslavia, DEP'T ST. DISPATCH, Nov. 16, 1992, at 825 ("At least 150
Muslim women and teen-age girls-some as young as 14-who have crossed
into Bosnian Government-held areas of Sarajevo in recent weeks are in
advanced stages of pregnancy, reportedly after being raped by Serbian
nationalist fighters and after being imprisoned for months afterwards in an
attempt to keep them from terminating their pregnancies."); Mazowiecki, supra
note 2, Annex II, 9 (identifying 119 pregnancies resulting from rape in 1992
alone).
4See Jan Goodwin, Rwanda: Justice Denied, ON THE ISSUES, Fall 1997, at 26,
29 ("In the hundred days of genocidal nightmare, an estimated 250,000 women
were raped or forced into sexual slavery."); James C. McKinley, Jr., Legacy of
Rwanda Violence: The Thousands Born of Rape, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1996,
at Al.5See id. ("By conservative estimates, there are 2,000 to 5,000 unwanted
children in Rwanda whose mothers were raped during the civil war .... ).
6See Middle East Watch, A Victory Turned Sour, Human Rights in Kuwait
Since Liberation, Sept. 1991.
7See Brownmiller, supra note 1, at 78-80.8See WAR CRIMES ON ASIAN WOMEN: MILITARY SEXUAL SLAVERY BY JAPAN
DURING WORLD WAR 11: THE CASE OF THE FILIPINO COMFORT WOMEN (Dan P.
Calica & Nelia Sancho eds., 1993).
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to justice. While many perpetrators have been shielded from
prosecution and punishment by their own governments, 9 those
who are pursued by their governments frequently seek refuge in
other countries. Furthermore, the international community's
attempts to redress these offenses have been, until recently, quite
limited.'0  The initial international response to reports
confirming the brutal and systematic use of rape in the former
Yugoslavia, for instance, was confined to expressions of public
outrage and condemnation."I Although the United Nations
Security Council voted in 1993 to establish an international
tribunal to prosecute abuses committed in the region, 12 the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 13 is
hindered by substantial legal and practical difficulties.
Questions relating to resources, the identification, arrest and
detention of accused persons, the gathering of proof on
incidences of violence against women, and the rules of evidence
and procedure have yet to be resolved for the Tribunal to
become effective. 14 Moreover, the jurisdiction of the Tribunal is
9See Helsinki Watch, Prosecute Now!, Aug. 1993, at 12, 13 (documenting an
incident in 1992 when fifteen members of a Bosnian Croat paramilitary group
allegedly gang-raped five Serbian women, but were released without
?Irosecution by the Bosnian Croat police).
See Amy Ray, The Shame of It: Gender-Based Terrorism in the Former
Yugoslavia and the Failure of International Human Rights Law to
Comprehend the Injuries, 46 Am. U. L. REv. 793, 798 (1997) ("[D]espite the
thousands of women raped and prostituted... no one ever had been tried for
rape as a war crime until th[e] conflict [in the former Yugoslavia]."). Although
rape was discussed by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East in the
Tokyo Judgment after the Second World War, it was not expressly charged as
a separate offense. Id. at 798 n.30.
"See Ex-Yugoslavia: Mass Rape, supra note 2, at 42 (discussing the United
Nations Security Council decision to unanimously and publicly condemn the
"atrocities committed against women" in Bosnia and Herzegovinia).
t2Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of the Security
Council Resolution 808, U.N. SCOR 48th Sess., plen. mtgs. at 8, U.N. Doc.
S/2504 (1993) [hereinafter Report of the Secretary-General] (establishing the
International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of
the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991).
13The crime of rape is included in the Tribunal's Statute as a crime against
humanity. STATUTE OF THE INT'L TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, art.
5(g), reprinted in 14 HUM. RTS. L.J. 211 (1993). Rape is, therefore, among the
offenses which the Tribunal was set up to prosecute.
14See Stephens, supra note I, at 148-49. Although the United Nations Security
Council also voted in 1994 to establish an international tribunal to prosecute
abuses committed in Rwanda, Goodwin, supra note 4, at 30, that tribunal faces
even greater difficulties. Located in the remote town of Arusha, Tanzania, the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda is poorly equipped and poorly
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limited to offenses committed in the former Yugoslavia. Thus,
women who were or may in the future be raped in other conflicts
around the world may not rely on the Tribunal to seek redress
for their injuries.1
5
The purpose of this article is to explore an alternative
remedy now being pursued in United States courts by victims of
these abuses: a private, civil action against the perpetrators
under the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA). The ATCA permits a
non-citizen to bring a civil action in United States District
Courts for torts "committed in violation of the law of nations or
a treaty of the United States."' 16 Women seeking relief under the
ATCA must prove, therefore, that rape or other acts of gender-
based violence committed in situations of conflict 17 violate
either the "law of nations" or a "treaty of the United States."
Two different strategies potentially accomplish this goal.
The first strategy relies on existing international law,
including human rights or humanitarian law treaties and
customary international law,18 which forbids torture, war crimes,
crimes against humanity, and genocide. This strategy posits that,
properly understood, this existing, so-called gender-neutral body
of law prohibits rape and other forms of gender-based violence
committed during wartime. The second strategy argues that the
particular characteristics of rape and other acts of gender-based
violence cannot and should not be subsumed under these
broader international torts. Instead, these claims ought to be
brought under the separate evolving international tort of gender
violence. This article evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of
managed. Id. Indeed, despite the hundreds of thousands of women raped in
the Rwandan conflict, by 1997 there had "not yet been a single rape indictment
handed down by the [Tribunal]." Id.
15See Chinkin, supra note 1, at 339.
16Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994).
17Although both men and women can be and are raped, causing severe injury
for both, this article deals exclusively with the rape of women. In the context
of armed conflict, the numbers suggest that rape is essentially a crime
committed against women. See Chinkin, supra note 1, at 326. Furthermore,
women may be subject to particular injuries from rape, such as forced
impregnation or forced maternity, that are not shared by men. See infra notes
50-51 and accompanying text.
18Customary international law consists of norms that states follow as a general
practice due to a sense of legal obligation. These norms are established from
the "general and consistent practice of states," but need not be articulated in a
treaty in order to be binding. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(2), (4) (1987).
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each strategy and suggests that, although neither approach is
completely satisfactory, the most effective strategy employs
gender-neutral international instruments while conveying the
particular characteristics of gender-based violence through
carefully crafted narratives.
H-. THE ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT
The ATCA permits a non-citizen to bring a civil action in
a United States District Court for torts "committed in violation
of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States."'
19
Originally a provision of the 1789 Judiciary Act, the ATCA
remained in relative obscurity for nearly 200 years. 20  In the
1980 landmark case, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, the Second Circuit
breathed new life into the statute by interpreting it to allow
federal courts to adjudicate suits alleging tortious conduct
proscribed by international law.2 1 The case was brought by a
Paraguayan citizen against a former police inspector-general of
Paraguay who had tortured the plaintiffs son to death. The
Filartiga court held that although the United States had not yet
ratified a treaty prohibiting torture, "deliberate torture
perpetrated under color of official authority violates universally
accepted norms of the international law of human rights ....
Thus, whenever an alleged torturer is found and served with
process by an alien within our borders, § 1350 provides federal
jurisdiction." 22 Filartiga opened the door for plaintiffs to argue
that violations of international human rights law are actionable
under the ATCA. Moreover, the case established that in
ascertaining the content of the "law of nations," courts must
look to the "works of jurists ... the general usage and practice
of nations... [and] judicial decisions recognizing and enforcing
that law., 23  Indeed, Filartiga made clear that courts are to
"interpret the law not as it was in 1789, but as it has evolved and
exists among the nations of the world today."
24
'928 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994).20See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 887 n.21 (2d Cir. 1980).
21See id. at 887.
22Id. at 878. Most courts have followed Filartiga in finding that the Alien Tort
Claims Act grants both jurisdiction and a cause of action for torts cognizable in
international law. See In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights
Litigation, 978 F.2d 493, 498 (9th Cir. 1992) and Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 694
F. Supp. 707, 712 (N.D. Cal. 1988) [hereinafter Forti II].
23Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880 (2d Cir. 1980).
24 d. at 881.
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Although plaintiffs have succeeded in obtaining relief
under the ATCA, several significant obstacles restrict access to
alien tort actions. Individual defendants must ordinarily be
physically present within the district in which the suit is filed, at
the time the suit is initiated, in order to satisfy the requirement
of personal jurisdiction.25 Furthermore, the defendant must not
be immune from suit by virtue of being, for example, a diplomat
26or head of state. Also, governments are immune from suit
under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.2 7 Despite these
limitations, the ATCA has proven to be an invaluable tool in the
effort to redress human rights violations. Since the Filartiga
decision, multi-million dollar judgments have been awarded to
victims of human rights abuses. In light of these decisions,
women seeking a remedy for rape or other forms of gender-
based violence may find the ATCA an important avenue of
relief.
III. REDRESS UNDER THE ATCA USING GENDER-
NEUTRAL INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS
One method of bringing a wartime rape claim under the
ATCA is to argue that existing international human rights or
humanitarian law treaties and/or customary international law
prohibit rape and other forms of gender-based violence
committed during wartime.29 Given Filartiga's recognition of
the torture of one Paraguayan individual as a violation of
customary international law, it is arguable that the brutal
violence against many women in situations of conflict3 ' falls
within the conduct forbidden by treaties such as the Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment, 32 the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 33  and the
25Stephens, supra note 1, at 153.26See id.
2 7See id.
28See, e.g., Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162 (D. Mass. 1995), Todd v.
Panjaitan, No. 92-12255, 1994 WL 827111, (D. Mass. Oct. 26, 1994), Paul v.
Avril, 901 F. Supp. 330 (S.D. Fla. 1994). Although none of the judgments in
these cases have been paid, collection is possible in at least some. See
Stephens, supra note 1, at 154 & n.43.29See RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 18, at § 102.30See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980).3tSee supra notes 1-8 and accompanying text.32Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, opened for signature Feb. 4, 1985, 23 I.L.M. 1027
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Convention on Prevention and Punishment of the crime of
Genocide, 34  or by other international instruments which
proscribe crimes against humanity. 35 The question is whether
these treaties, gender-neutral on their face, provide an adequate
framework within which to address rape and other forms of
gender-specific violence.
The strategy of using gender-neutral treaties to pursue
wartime rape claims under the ATCA has significant
advantages. Many of the norms embodied in these treaties have
either been adopted by the United States through ratification of
these treaties36 or have, arguably, become part of customary
international law.37 Notably, plaintiffs who have succeeded in
obtaining relief under the ATCA have relied almost exclusively
on these widely accepted international treaties.38 Indeed, while
the Filartiga court left open whether a more expansive reading
(1984), modified 24 I.L.M. 535 (1985) [hereinafter Convention Against
Torture].33Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 for the Protection of War Victims,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Geneva
Conventions].34Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention].3 5Crimes against humanity are defined by various international human rights
instruments, including the Charters for the International Military Tribunals of
Nuremberg and the Far East, see Charter of the International Military Tribunal,
annexed to Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War
Criminals of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, art. 6(c), 59 Stat. 1544, 82
U.N.T.S. 279 and the Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far
East, Jan. 19, 1946, amended April 26, 1946, art. 5(c), T.I.A.S. No. 1589, and
the statute establishing the international tribunal to prosecute violations in the
former Yugoslavia, see STATUTE OF THE INT'L TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA, supra note 13, at art. 5.36The United States consented, with reservations, to the ratification of the
Convention Against Torture in 1990. 136 CONG. REC. S10091-92 (July 19,
1990) (Text of Resolution Ratification). The United States is also a party to
the Geneva Conventions and the Genocide Convention. See FRANK NEWMAN
& DAVID WEISSBRODT, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: LAW, POLICY AND
PROCESSES 401-02 (1990) (listing human rights and humanitarian law treaties
to which the United States is a party).37The 1949 Geneva Conventions, which provide for humane treatment of
noncombatants in wartime and prohibit war crimes, and the Genocide
Convention, which proscribes genocide, are widely regarded to have achieved
the status of customary international law. See Report of the Secretary-General,
supra note 12, at 65 (discussing acceptance of these Conventions as customary
international law).38See, e.g., Filartiga v. Irala-Pena, 630 F.2d 876; Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F.
Supp 162; Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844 (11 th Cir. 1996) (relying on the
Convention Against Torture to support ATCA claims).
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of the ATCA is possible, it emphasized that its reading of the
statute merely opened "the federal courts for adjudication of the
rights already recognized by international law."39  Thus, if
plaintiffs are able to demonstrate that the wrong they suffered
has been expressly condemned by the international communi %
through international treaties or international customary law,
the ATCA will likely reach their claim.
This strategy of redress for the violence women suffer in
times of war is not without difficulties, however. First, violence
against women, including rape and other forms of gender-based
violence, has received very little attention from international
human rights scholars and organizations. 4 1 Until very recently,
violations of human rights suffered predominantly by women
because of their gender were not classified as human rights
abuses.42 When women were raped or violated in ways specific
39Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 887 (emphasis added). More specifically, the court
noted that "[i]t is only where the nations of the world have demonstrated that
the wrong is of mutual, and not merely several, concern, by means of express
international accords, that a wrong generally recognized becomes an
international law violation within the meaning of [the ATCA]." Id. at 888.4 0Some wrongs are not only prohibited by customary international law, but are
also described as violations of jus cogens. The concept of jus cogens is
defined in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties as "a peremptory
norm of general international law[, that] is[,] a norm accepted and recognized
by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no
derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm
of general international law having the same character." 1155 U.N.T.S. 331,
344 (art. 53), 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 875, 891 (1969). The doctrine ofjus cogens
is, therefore, viewed as "guarding the most fundamental and highly-valued
interests of international society, as an expression of a conviction, accepted in
all parts of the world community, which touches the deeper conscience of all
nations .... ." Hilary Charlesworth and Christine Chinkin, The Gender of Jus
Cogens, 15 HUM. RTS. Q. 63, 66-67 (1993) (internal citations omitted). The
American Law Institute has categorized genocide, slave trade, murder, torture,
prolonged arbitrary detention and systematic racial discrimination as violations
ofjus cogens. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note
18, at § 702.
41See Charlotte Bunch, Women's Rights as Human's Rights: Toward a Revision
of Human Rights, 12 HUM. RTs. Q. 486 (1990); Hilary Charlesworth, What are
Women's International Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN: NATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 58, 60, 68 (Rebecca J. Cook ed., 1995).
42See Margareth Etienne, Addressing Gender-Based Violence in an
International Context, 18 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 139, 143 (1995) (discussing
reluctance by the United Nations to classify gender-based abuses "within the
nexus of existing human rights doctrines."). See also Charlesworth and
Chinkin, supra note 40, at 67-72 (arguing thatjus cogens norms reflect a male
perspective of what is fundamental to international society).
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to their gender, the offenses were often categorized as private
wrongs, not within the domain of public and universal
condemnation and, consequently, not cognizable under
traditional international human rights law.43 On the other hand,
when women were beaten or tortured or otherwise violated in
the same way that men are, the fact that the victims were women
was "not registered in the record of human atrocity." 44 Rather,
the women were "counted as Argentinian or Honduran or
Jewish" victims of human rights abuses. 45 The result has been,
as Catharine MacKinnon has aptly noted, that "[w]hat is done to
women is either too specific to women to be seen as human or
too generic to human beings to be seen as specific to women."
46
This legacy of women's invisibility within the international
human rights system presents the first in a long road of complex
challenges in the effort to pursue gender-based violence claims
under so-called "gender neutral" treaties.
Second, because gender-neutral treaties proscribing
international human rights or humanitarian law violations
primarily reflect male experiences, they fail to capture the
distinct injuries that result from rape and other forms of gender-
based violence. 47 The physical pain and suffering experienced
by a woman during a rape attack arguably fits within the
existing definitions of torture,48 war crimes, or crimes against
humanity.49 However, the continuing injury sustained by a
woman forced to carry a fetus, endure labor, and give birth to a
child conceived as a result of rape, is not ordinarily
43Catharine A. MacKinnon, Rape, Genocide and Women's Human Rights, 17
HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 5, 14 (1994). See also Celina Romany, Women as Aliens:
A Feminist Critique of the Public/Private Distinction in International Human
Rights Law, 6 HARV. HUM. RTs. J. 87 (1993); Charlesworth, supra note 41, at
68-9.
44MacKinnon, supra note 43, at 5.45Id.
461d. at 6.47See TENTH ANNUAL INTERNATIONAL LAW SYMPOSIUM 1993, SELECT PANEL
DISCUSSION: HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AGAINST WOMEN, 15 Whittier L.
REv. 319, 320-323 (1994) (testimony of Laurel Fletcher) [hereinafter PANEL
DISCUSSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AGAINST WOMEN].43See Stephens, supra note 1, at 156 (arguing that understood as a crime of
violence involving physical and psychological abuse, rape by a public official
meets the international definition of torture).49See Theodor Meron, Rape as a Crime Under International Human Rights
Law, 87 AM. J. INT'L. L. 424, 425-28 (1993) (discussing the increasing
international recognition of rape as a war crime and a crime against humanity).
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characterized or included as a human rights violation.5 0 Nor is
the permanent stigma, trauma, and degradation experienced by
women who live in societies that brand sexually violated women
as "damaged property"5' recognized as such. Feminist human
rights advocates have argued that the effort to subsume female
experience of sexualized violence in warfare to male-centered
norms reflected in international legal instruments does women a
grave disservice. Indeed, some advocates argue that pursuing
this strategy only heightens women's invisibility within the
international human rights sphere.
52
A third problem with bringing gender-based violence
claims under gender-neutral treaties concerns the difficult
interpretive gymnastics required to fit crimes of sexual violence
against women under the existing categories of torture, war
crimes, crimes against humanity, or genocide. The Geneva
Conventions, for example, contain a provision listing
particularly serious violations of humanitarian law that qualify
as "grave breaches" or war crimes. 53  Yet, the Geneva
Conventions do not expressly list rape as a "grave breach."
Only recently have international scholars and organizations
begun to argue that, under a broad construction of the Geneva
Conventions, rape may be included as a "grave breach" on the
grounds that the list was not intended to be exhaustive, and that
5°See Fionnuala Ni Aolain, The Entrenchment of Systematic Abuse: Mass Rape
in Former Yugoslavia, 8 HARV. HUM. RTs. J. 285, 288-89 (1995) (reviewing
MASS RAPE: THE WAR AGAINST WOMEN IN FORMER YUGOSLAVIA (Alexandra
Stiglmayer, ed. 1994) [hereinafter MASS RAPE]).5 1Susan Brownmiller, Making Female Bodies the Battlefield, in MASS RAPE,
supra note 50, at 180-81. Several reports have documented that women have
been violently abused by their spouses or families after revealing that they had
been raped. Ray, supra note 10, at 805 (discussing reports that husbands killed
or abandoned their wives who were raped and that families disowned young
unmarried women who were raped).
52See Katherine Lusby, Hearing the Invisible Women of Political Rape: Using
Oppositional Narrative to Tell a New War Story, 25 U. TOL. L. REV. 911, 912,
952-53 (1995) (arguing that this kind of analysis has rendered women's
particular experience invisible); Ni Aolain, supra note 50, at 288 (discussing
author who argues that the danger in categorizing rape as a crime of genocide
is making "invisible acts of sexual violence and subsum[ing] them in the wider
category of human destruction.").
53See Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, arts. 146, 147
(hereinafter Geneva Convention IV). See also Francoise Krill, The Protection
of Women in International Humanitarian Law, 25 INT'L REV. RED CROSS, 337,
341 (1985).
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the gravity of the offense merits its inclusion. 4 That this
argument has only recently received significant attention is
troublesome, given that the history of sexual violence against
women in situations of conflict is as old as the incidence of
armed conflict itself.5 5 The international community's delay in
perceiving rape as a "grave breach" suggests the risk of leaving
the "[e]nforcement of women's rights and recognition of the
nature of gender-based violence . . . to argument and
interpretation."
5 6
Fourth, even if plaintiffs are able to squeeze their
particular experience into existing doctrinal cubbyholes, they
face the further challenge of meeting all of the elements of
internationally recognized torts. Establishing the elements of
these gender-neutral torts will often require female plaintiffs to
demonstrate not only that they were raped, but also that the rape
was committed in furtherance of some other unacceptable goal,
such as intimidation, coercion, or the destruction of a particular
ethnic group.
For instance, under the Convention Against Torture, the
definition of torture includes three components: 1) an act
causing severe physical or mental suffering, 2) committed with
the intent to obtain information, to punish, intimidate or coerce,
or for any discriminatory reason, 3) by a government official.57
Thus, if an official rapes a woman without an intent to extract
information from, intimidate, coerce, or punish her, the act may
not be considered torture. Further, even if the act is committed
with the requisite intent, it does not constitute torture if it is
committed by someone other than a public official. s
54Meron, supra note 49, at 426.55See Brownmiller, supra note 1, at 31-113.
5 6PANEL DISCUSSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AGAINST WOMEN, supra
note 47, at 323.57Convention Against Torture, supra note 32, at art. 1 (1).
58It is worth noting, however, that the Inter-American Court of Human Rights,
responsible for interpreting the provisions of the American Convention on
Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, reprinted in 9 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 673 (1970),
has held that while international law generally does not recognize state
responsibility for the conduct of private parties, violations of human rights by
private actors become imputable to the state when a state abandons its
responsibility to take adequate measures to prevent, investigate, and punish
these violations. Velasquez Rodriguez Case, Judgment of July 29, 1988, Inter-
Am. C.H.R. (ser. C, no. 4) para. 172 (1988), ("An illegal act . . . which is
initially not directly imputable to a State (for example, because it is the act of a
private person or because the person responsible has not been identified) can
lead to international responsibility of the State, not because of the act itself, but
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This requirement is particularly onerous for women in
situations characterized as civil or internal armed conflicts. If
the perpetrators of rape in those conflicts belong to an armed
opposition group not yet recognized as a state, they are normally
not considered state, or public, officials. Consequently, victims
are unable to establish one of the elements of torture necessary
to support their claim under the ATCA.59 A recent case filed by
two separate teams of feminist lawyers in the United States on
behalf of victims of rape and other abuses allegedly committed
under the command of Radovan Karadzic, President of the self-
proclaimed Bosnian-Serb republic of "Srpska," illustrates this
point.60 Finding that the "current Bosnian-Serb warring military
faction does not constitute a recognized state," 61 the court
concluded that the acts alleged were committed by non-state
actors.62 The absence of state action barred the plaintiffs from
proceeding with their claims under the pre-existing international
tort of torture. Although the decision was later reversed and the
plaintiffs were given an opportunity to prove that Karadzic's
regime satisfied the international definition of statehood,63 the
Court of Appeals stressed that torture is condemned by
international law "only when committed by state officials or
because of the lack of due diligence to prevent the violation or to respond to it
as required by the Convention."). See also Anthony Ewing, Establishing State
Responsibility for Private Acts of Violence Against Women Under the
American Convention on Human Rights, 26 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 751,
767-68 (1995); Rebecca Cook, State Responsibility for Violations of Women's
Human Rights, 7 HARV. HUM. RTs. J. 125, 142, 151-52 (1994). Although
Velasquez Rodriguez constitutes persuasive authority for the interpretation of
other international conventions, whether plaintiffs seeking redress under the
ATCA would succeed by relying on this case remains an open question. As
commentators have noted, despite its discussion of state responsibility for
private conduct, "the Court was convinced that state actors were responsible
for the disappearances in th[at] case, and the standard for state responsibility
may amount to broad dictum." Michelle Lewis Liebeskind, Preventing
Gender-Based Violence: From Marginalization to Mainstream in International
Human Rights, 63 REv. JUR. U.P.R. 645 (1994).
59See MacKinnon, supra note 43, at 15 (noting that because international
human rights instruments generally regulate the conduct of states and not
private individuals, "[tjhe more a conflict can be framed as within a state--as a
civil war, as domestic, as private--the less effective the human rights model
becomes.").
6°Doe v. Karadzic, 866 F. Supp. 734 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).61id. at 741
21d. at 739.
63See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 245 (2d Cir. 1995).
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under color of law "64 and that plaintiffs must make a
preliminary showing of state action before a court can entertain
the claim.
Moreover, feminist scholars have noted that even when
the doctrinal elements of torture are present, additional elements
have been required. For example, the international community
has sometimes imposed a requirement that the torture take place
while the victim is detained in an official setting.65  Amnesty
International, while recognizing rape as torture when the act
takes place in areas under police or military control, has failed to
recognize that "women's detention and rape in non-traditional
settings such as fields, road sides, village squares and their own
homes is also torture." 66 In light of the fact that the torture of
women often takes place in settings other than prisons or
traditional places of detention, this extra requirement severely
limits the recognition of rape as torture.
Similar barriers against establishing the elements of a
claim arise when victims of rape or other forms of gender-based
violence attempt to categorize their injury as genocide or a
crime against humanity. Crimes against humanity are defined to
include "enslavement ... and other inhumane acts committed
against any civilian population." 68 Under this definition, rape
will be considered a crime against humanity only if it is
committed because of the victim's membership in a targeted
civilian population.69  Thus, while a commission of experts
appointed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations
defined crimes against humanity to include rape and mentioned
forced prostitution as a related offense, the acts meet the
definition only if they are committed "as part of a widespread or
systematic attack against any civilian population on national,
'Id. at 243-44.65See Lusby, supra note 52, at 939.
661d.
67See id. (citing Deborah Blatt, Recognizing Rape as a Method of Torture, 19
N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 821, 850 (1992) (noting that torture often
takes place in the home because "'intimidation of the populace ... is most
effectively accomplished when officials rape women in their homes because
family members often witness the attack and share in the feeling of degradation
and powerlessness."').
68Charter of the International Military Tribunal of Nuremberg, supra note 35 at
art. 6(c) and Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East,
supra note 35, at art. 5(c).
69See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Opinion and Judgment of May 7, 1997, Int'l Crim.
Tribunal Former Yugoslavia, Case No. IT-94-l, T.Ch.II, para. 644.
70See Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 12, at 13.
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political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds." 71 Similarly, acts
"causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of [a]
group" or intended to "forcibly transfer ... children of [one]
group to another group" are defined as genocide only when
committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a
national, ethnic, racial or religious group. 72 These definitions
appear to exclude contexts in which rape is neither widespread
nor linked to "ethnic cleansing."
Indeed, under these definitions, rape and other forms of
gender-based violence are perceived as international torts only
when they are the vehicles for some other form of persecution.
Feminist international scholars caution that there are long-term
consequences in seeking a remedy for these wrongs under
gender-neutral international instruments. Not only does this
strategy obscure the gender dimension of rape and sexual
violence against women, it enhances the risk that rape in war
will be perceived and treated as "a product of exceptional
circumstances." 73 This approach would minimize the protection
for women who are raped in situations of conflict, but not in the
context of genocide or as part of a widespread and systematic
attack against an entire population. As feminist scholars have
noted, women are raped in war for many reasons. They are
raped "as a prize, like a fine painting, a chest of gold, for which
the war is fought;" "for sexual gratification, to boost male ego
and differentiate male and female;" "to reconnect with
humanity, as inhuman as that is;" and "to disconnect the men
from humanity, to better enable the warrior to commit other
atrocities." 74 Overemphasizing the horrors of genocidal rape or
rape related to ethnic cleansing is likely to result in the
exclusion of women's claims of rape in war for purposes of
domination, booty, or revenge.
75
7'1 d. (definition within the commentary). Similarly, the Statute of the
International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia grants the Tribunal the power
to prosecute rape "when committed in armed conflict ... and directed against
any civilian population." STATUTE OF THE INT'L TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA, supra note 13, at art. 5.
72Genocide Convention, supra note 34, at art. 2.
73Rhonda Copelon, Gendered War Crimes: Reconceptualizing Rape in Time of
War, in WOMEN'S RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL FEMINIST
PERSPECTIVES 197, 207 (Julie Peters and Andrea Wolper eds., 1995).74Lusby, supra note 52, at 952.
75See Dorothy Q. Thomas and Regan E. Ralph, Rape in War: Challenging the
Tradition of Impunity, SAIS REV., Winter-Spring 1994, at 81, 86 ("Th[e]
emphasis on rape's scale as to what makes it an abuse demanding redress
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Finally, plaintiffs seeking relief under gender-neutral
treaties face a fifth concern. They may discover that widely
read international scholars or judges, both sources of law under
the ATCA that courts must look to when deciding whether
international human rights have been violated,76 will continue to
perceive and portray rape and gender-based violence as outside
the reach of gender-neutral international torts. If so, the
application of gender-neutral treaties to gender-based acts of
violence, even when such acts meet the doctrinal elements of the
international tort in question, may result in a discriminatory
impact on claims brought by female plaintiffs under the ATCA.
Although not enough ATCA cases brought by female plaintiffs
have been decided since 1980 to assess whether application of
gender-neutral treaties has resulted in gender discrimination, the
few cases where women have been plaintiffs suggest that courts
are unwilling to grapple with the gender issue.
In Kadic v. Karadzic, for instance, where plaintiffs
specifically alleged rape among a list of other offenses, the court
never directly addressed the question of whether rape amounts
to torture.77 Similarly, in a case where a nun was kidnapped,
raped, and otherwise tortured by security forces under the
command of a Guatemalan official, the court failed to discuss
how, if at all, the act of sexual violence fell within the definition
of torture. 78  Instead, in finding for the plaintiff, the court
referred collectively to the "acts of torture" inflicted upon the
plaintiff by the defendant.79 Courts' unwillingness to come to
terms with the gender issue may indicate a reluctance to find for
plaintiffs in cases where the only tortious act alleged is a gender-
based act or where the acts, other than those which are gender-
based, are not severe enough to trigger the protections of
international treaties. Thus, although they may meet the
doctrinal elements of a gender-neutral tort, claims brought by
female plaintiffs alleging gender-based acts of violence may not
succeed as readily as those alleging other types of acts which
distorts the nature of rape in war by failing to reflect both the experience of
individual women and the various functions of wartime rape.").
76See Filartiga v. Pena-lrala, 630 F.2d at 880.
77See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d at 241-44.78See Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. at 178 (finding, without further
explanation, the "factual allegations ... as admitted by virtue of defendant's
default.., more than sufficient to establish that Gramajo [defendant] did under
color of law (by his order and command) subject Ortiz [plaintiff] to torture...
T'Id. at 198.
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have traditionally been recognized as violations of international
law.
80
In light of courts' unwillingness to recognize the gender-
based aspects of rape and sexual violence against women, some
feminist scholars have proposed that storytelling be used to
increase judges' understanding of the complexity of these
crimes and, thereby, to "counteract the resistance [they have] to
siding with the victim." Using what one author has termed
"oppositional narrative, ' 82 stories can be constructed that relate
women's particular experiences and allow a judge to "re-
evaluate his world view and restructure his ears to become...
better able to hear that which is beyond personal experience" 83
and the narrow categories of gender-neutral law. By drawing
attention to the "diverse, multifarious and complex" character
of rape and gender-based violence, storytelling can also be used
to overcome the risk, which the gender-neutral strategy
engenders, of obscuring the gender dimension of these crimes.
IV. REDRESS UNDER THE ATCA USING THE
GENDER-SPECIFIC APPROACH
80Since 1976, statutes with a discriminatory impact have become
extraordinarily difficult to challenge. After Washington v. Davis, where the
Supreme Court held that proof of disproportionate impact was insufficient to
establish an equal protection violation, a plaintiff must prove discriminatory
motivation. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976). See also
Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (holding that
although a civil service preference scheme for veterans had a devastating
impact upon the employment opportunities for women, the plaintiffs failed to
prove intent). It would be an almost impossible task to prove that the drafters
of gender-neutral international conventions were motivated by a discriminatory
intent. Yet, if plaintiffs rely solely on gender-neutral treaties to bring gender-
based claims under the ATCA, later advocates may be stymied by the difficulty
of challenging the statute as discriminatory. Thus, although it may prove
successful for individual plaintiffs, pursuing gender-based claims under a
gender-neutral approach may present significant challenges as a long-run
strategy for advocates concerned with maintaining the ATCA as an avenue of
relief for women whose primary or only allegations are gender-based acts.
8 tLusby, supra note 52, at 953.
82Lusby describes the term "oppositional narrative" as the presentation "in
narrative or story form the realities of people, in this case women, which are
different from the realities or stdck stories understood by most. The narratives
are oppositional because they cause the reader to react initially as though the
stock story and the oppositional narrative were polarities, although the goal is
integration of stories by the reader." Id. at 913 n.6.
831d. at 953.
4Id. at 952.
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In light of the difficulties discussed above in seeking a
remedy for rape and other gender-based acts of violence under
the gender-neutral strategy, international feminist scholars have
begun to explore an alternative approach: bringing gender-based
violence claims under gender-specific international instruments.
There are primarily three international documents that proscribe
violence against women: 1) General Recommendation No. 19
adopted by the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination
Against Women; 85 2) the 1993 Declaration on the Elimination of
Violence Against Women; 86 and 3) specific provisions under the
Geneva Conventions and Two Additional Protocols proscribing
rape in times of war.
87
These international instruments define violations of
human rights with respect to women's experiences. The
Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women
(DEVAW), for instance, defines violence against women as
"any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to
result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to
women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary
deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or private,,88
life. Specific forms of violence are identified as falling
within the scope of this definition, including "physical, sexual
and psychological violence occurring within the general
community" or "perpetrated or condoned by the State, wherever
it occurs."89 The definition addresses some of the serious
shortcomings of the so-called gender-neutral treaties. It
incorporates the distinct injuries that result from sexual violence
85General Recommendation No. 19 on Violence Against Women, U.N.
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, U.N. Doc.
CEDAW/C/1 992/L. ]/Add. 15 (1992) [hereinafter General Recommendation
No. 19].
86Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, U.N.
Commission on the Status of Women, U.N.G.A. Res. 48/104, U.N. GAOR,
48th Sess., Supp. (No. 49) at 217, U.N. Doc. A/48/49 (1993) [hereinafter
DEVA JI.
87Geneva Convention IV, supra note 53, at art. 27; Protocol Additional to the
Geneva Conventions of 12 August, 1949, Relating to the Protection of Victims
of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 16 I.L.M.
1391, art. 76(1) [hereinafter Protocol I]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August, 1949, Relating to the Protection of Victims on
Non-International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609, 16
I.L.M. 1422 (1977), art. 4(2)(e) [hereinafter Protocol II].88DEVA W, supra note 86, at art. 1.
891d. at art. 2.
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against women, encompasses violence by non-state actors, and
reaches acts outside of traditional centers of detention. The
definition relieves plaintiffs from having to engage in the
interpretive gymnastics required to bring a claim under gender-
neutral treaties. Furthermore, seeking redress for gender-based
violence under gender-specific treaties "surfaces" 90 women,
acknowledging the gender dimension of rape and sexual
violence and countering women's invisibility in the international
human rights sphere.
While this strategy may have far-reaching effects on the
world community's awareness of the particular injuries women
face when violated in times of war, obtaining an actual remedy
using these gender-specific instruments under the ATCA may
prove difficult, if not impossible. Furthermore, even if
successful in obtaining relief using these instruments, women
may find that reliance on gender-specific provisions will result
in reinforcing traditional sex stereotypes and marginalizing
women's rights as a "specialized" and less significant branch of
international human rights or humanitarian law.
The most serious drawback to pursuing an ATCA claim
using gender-specific international instruments is that the
international tort of gender violence has not yet reached the
level of universality required to meet the definition of customary
international law or jus cogens, which would trigger the
protection of the statute. As discussed above, Filartiga held that
only where a wrong is either recognized by international law or
condemned by the nations of the world by "means of express
international accords" does that wrong become "an international
law violation within the meaning of the statute."91  While
unanimity among nations is not required, "[a]n international tort
which appears and disappears as one travels around the world is
clearly lacking in that level of common understanding necessary
to create universal consensus."
92
Although the empirical evidence of violence against
women is strong, the proscription of gender-based violence has
not yet been allocated the status of a fundamental tenet of
international law. As one scholar notes, "[t]he doctrine ofjus
90The term "surface," meaning to make visible, was borrowed from Rhonda
Copelon who uses it in her article, Surfacing Gender: Reconceptualizing
Crimes Against Women in Time of War, in MASS RAPE, supra note 50, at 197.
91Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d at 888.92Forti 11, 694 F. Supp. at 712.
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cogens, with its claim to reflect central, fundamental aspirations
of the international community, has not responded at all to
massive evidence of injustice and aggression against women."
93
Although Geneva Convention IV and the Additional Protocols
explicitly condemn rape and other forms of gender-violence,
94
these offenses are not listed among the Convention's grave
breaches, the particularly serious violations of humanitarian law
which require states to sanction or extradite the perpetrator.
95
That DEVAW, one of the three available international
documents addressing violence against women, has been drafted
as a non-binding "declaration" rather than a "convention"
carrying sanctions for non-compliance, further reveals the lack
of global consensus necessary to elevate the tort of gender
violence to the status of customary international law or jus
cogens. Of course, a tort need not be prohibited by customary
international law in order to be actionable under the ATCA if it
is expressly prohibited by a treaty of the United States.
96
However, the U.S. has not yet ratified the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW), 97 the only binding treaty proscribing gender-based
violence.
93Charlesworth and Chinkin, supra note 40, at 72.
94See Geneva Convention IV, supra note 53, at art. 27(2) ("[W]omen shall be
especially protected against any attack on their honour, in particular against
rape, enforced prostitution, or any form of indecent assault."); Protocol 1, supra
note 87, at art. 76(1) ("[W]omen shall be the object of special respect and shall
be protected in particular against rape, forced prostitution and any other form
of indecent assault."); Protocol II, supra note 87, at art. 4(2)(e) (prohibiting
"[o]utrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading
treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault.").95Geneva Convention IV, supra note 53, at arts. 146, 147. See also Krill,
supra note 53, at 341. But see supra note 54 and accompanying text (noting
that scholars have begun to argue that, under a broad construction of the
Geneva Conventions, rape should be considered a grave breach).
"28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994) (the act reaches violations of international law that
are proscribed either by the "law of nations or a treaty of the United States")
(emphasis added).
97Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, adopted Dec. 18, 1979, G.A. Res. 34/180, U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 46
at 193, U.N. Doc. A/RES/34/180 (1980) (entered into force Sept. 3, 1981)
[hereinafter CEDAW]. See Loretta Ross, Stop Talking and Finish Women's
Treaty, USA TODAY, Sept. 27, 1996, at II A (discussing recent Congressional
refusal to ratify CEDAW). Although CEDAW does not specifically prohibit
gender-based violence, General Recommendation No. 19, which states that
"[g]ender-based violence may breach specific provisions of the Convention,
regardless of whether those provisions expressly mention violence," was
authoritatively issued by the Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of
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Given the evolving nature of international law and courts'
express recognition that they must interpret the ATCA in its
modem context,98 plaintiffs can argue that the prohibition
against gender-based violence has now attained the status of a
customary international norm. However, for a plaintiff to
establish a customary norm, she must prove that the norm is not
only universal, but also "definable and obligatory." 99  This
presents a difficult hurdle in light of courts' demonstrated
reluctance to recognize even widely accepted international
human rights violations as meeting these requirements. In Forti
I, for instance, the court found that although all international
legal authorities which prohibit torture also prohibit cruel,
inhuman or degrading punishment or treatment,100 the latter
offense was "too abstract" to meet the "definability"
requirement of an international customary norm.' 0 ' The court
emphasized that the parties had failed to offer a concrete
definition of "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment" and that,
absent universal consensus as to what conduct falls within its
contours, the tort is not actionable under the ATCA.1
02
Similarly, the court in Xuncax refused to recognize
plaintiffs claim of "constructive exile" 103 as actionable under
the statute, noting that "caution is required in identifying new
Discrimination Against Women as an interpretive guide and, therefore, is
assumed to be binding upon states parties as well. See Joan Fitzpatrick, The
Use of International Human Rights Norms to Combat Violence Against
Women, in HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN, supra note 41, at 556.
98See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d at 881.99Forti II, 694 F. Supp. at 709.
'"Id. at 711.01Id. at 712.
I102d. Plaintiffs in this case alleged, inter alia, the "disappearance" of a family
member, the deprivation of food and clothing and attempted rape during
detention, prolonged arbitrary detention, and the murder of a family member
by military and police during the Argentine military's "dirty war" against
suspected subversion. Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1537-38
(N.D. Cal. 1987) [hereinafter Forti I]. Nonetheless, the court noted that
plaintiffs failed to "state precisely what alleged actions constitute" the tort of
"cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." Forti II, 694 F. Supp.
at 711.
103The plaintiffs alleged that, as a consequence of defendant's acts, including
forcing the plaintiffs to witness the torture of an immediate relative and to
watch soldiers ransack their home and threaten their family, they "'were placed
in great fear for their lives ...and were forced to leave their homes and
country and flee into exile."' Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. at 187 (citing
Xuncax Prelim. Statement, Fourth Claim for Relief at 24, 77).
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violations ofjus cogens."'104 Although the court acknowledged
the international prohibition against discriminatory deportation
or expulsion, 10 it refused to interpret this prohibition as
encompassing acts which did not literally expel the plaintiff, but
nonetheless "had the effect of forcing [him] into exile."' 0 6 The
court admonished that the ATCA "does not provide warrant for
judges to engage in law-making when divining the 'law of
nations.' To recognize 'constructive expulsion' as a tortious
violation of international law would involve such law
making."'10 7 Given this reluctance to identify new violations of
customary international law, courts are unlikely to recognize
violations of women's human rights based on gender,
independent of their connection to genocide or torture, as
actionable international torts under the ATCA.
Plaintiffs opting to bring gender-based violence claims
using gender-specific provisions of international instruments
also run the risk that courts will perceive the offenses prohibited
by those provisions as less egregious than the offenses
prohibited by gender-neutral provisions. Blatt's discussion
illustrates this point:
While several international human rights bodies
have acknowledged that rape is a human rights
abuse, rape has consistently been analyzed apart
from other forms of torture or abuse, both
semantically and substantively. As a result,
rape is the only form of physical aggression that
a torturer may employ which has not been
consistently identified as torture .... When rape
has been identified as a human rights abuse it is
labeled as "ill-treatment" rather than torture.1
0 8
Thus, distinguishing rape from the gender-neutral provision
proscribing torture places an additional burden on women to
demonstrate that the sexually violent attack they endured was no
" 41d. at 189.
'O5See id. at 188.
'"Id. at 189.
107 Id.
108Blatt, supra note 67, at 843 (citations omitted).
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less severe than the abuse experienced by one who was
tortured.1
0 9
Even if the prohibition against gender-based violence
were to be accepted as a customary international norm and the
gender-specific treaty approach proved successful, the strategy
raises deeper, longer-term concerns for advocates seeking to
enhance the recognition of and respect for women's rights. The
gender-specific strategy may actually marginalize women's
rights cases as a separate, and implicitly less important, set of
human rights cases and aggravate the already entrenched sex
stereotypes that historically have worked to women's
disadvantage.
Feminist scholars have observed that international
instruments charged with addressing gender-specific issues not
only have weaker compliance obligations and monitoring
procedures, but are also inadequately funded."10 CEDAW's
only enforcement mechanism, for instance, is the filing of an
annual report with the General Assembly of the United
Nations. l Unlike other international committees that monitor
compliance with provisions of gender-neutral treaties, 112 the
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women, which considers the reports submitted by states parties,
is confined to meeting for "two weeks annually." 113  The
Committee is also geographically segregated from other
committees charged with eliminating discrimination.114
Because it is not officially connected with other human rights
committees within the United Nations structure, the Committee
receives less financial support and has fewer resources with
which to carry out its functions." 1 5 Similarly, as commentators
have noted, the development of DEVAW "raises the general
problem of compartmentalisation of women's rights in
09See also, Fitzpatrick, supra note 97, at 544 (positing that when torture and
rape are identified as two separate offenses, rape may be perceived as
"something different" or less grave than torture or ill-treatment).
"°See Charlesworth, supra note 41, at 59.
"See CEDAW, supra note 97, at art. 17.
12See Theodor Meron, Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Prohibition of
Discrimination Against Women, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 213, 213-14 (1990)
(observing that the enforcement mechanisms of the International Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and the Convention
Against Torture are not equally constrained).
1 3CEDAW, supra note 97, at art. 20.
"4See Etienne, supra note 42, at 149.
1
5See Meron, supra note 112, at 214.
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international law" and "reinforces the United Nations tendency
to relegate women's human fights to a special, under-resourced,
sphere." 116 If CEDAW and DEVAW are indications of how
marginalized women's international human fights instruments
can become, it follows that the pursuit of gender-based violence
claims solely under gender-specific instruments could
eventually lead to the subordination of women's fights cases
among the "mainstream" human fights community.
Moreover, the language used in international documents
that specifically addresses gender-based violence is also
troubling. Article 27 of Geneva Convention IV, for instance,
provides that "[w]omen shall be especially protected against any
attack on their honour, in particular against rape, enforced
prostitution, or any form of indecent assault.' Similarly,
Article 76(1) of Additional Protocol I provides that "women
shall be the object of special respect and shall be protected in
particular against rape, forced prostitution, and any other form
of indecent assault.""118 The use of the terms "attack on their
honour" and "indecent assault" to describe what most women
would identify as an act more akin to torture suggests, as one
scholar has aptly noted, that the provisions have "more to do
with how men perceive rape than how women do
themselves.""11 9 Viewed in light of other Geneva Convention
provisions, such as the obligation to treat women "with all
consideration due to their sex,"' 120 the proscriptions against rape
and other forms of gender-based violence appear to rest upon
stereotypes regarding women's special vulnerability and
inherent weakness. Indeed, as one commentary to the Second
Geneva Convention makes clear, the gender-specific provisions
were added to the Conventions because "every civilized country
[accords special consideration] to beings who are weaker . . .
and whose honour and modesty call for respect."' 2' Plaintiffs'
"6Hilary Charlesworth and Christine Chinkin, Violence Against Women: A
Global Issue, in WOMEN, MALE VIOLENCE AND THE LAW 13, 26 (J. Stubbs ed.,
1994).
,1Geneva Convention IV, supra note 53, at art. 27.
"8Protocol 1, supra note 87, at art. 76(1).
11Judith Gardam, Gender and Non-Combatant Immunity, 3 TRANSNAT'L L. &
CONTEMP. PROBs. 345, 360 (1993).
120Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick
and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85, art. 12 [hereinafter Geneva Convention II].
1
2
1lntemational Committ6 for the Red Cross, COMMENTARY ON THE 11 GENEVA
CONVENTION FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED,
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reliance on language that is steeped in paternalistic visions of
women's inferiority runs the risk of reinforcing traditional sex
stereotypes that have historically been used to women's
disadvantage. 1
22
An examination of the language used in decisions
upholding the constitutionality of gender-based rape laws
reveals that pursuing a gender-specific strategy may, in fact,
result in exacerbating sexual stereotypes of female vulnerability
and male protective power. For instance, in holding that the
"state is justified in subjecting only male offenders who attack
female victims to additional sanction[s] over and above the
penalties imposed on a female for comparable conduct," the
court in Country v. Parrat emphasized that "the equality of the
sexes expresses a societal goal, not a physical metamorphosis."
123 The court explained that "[ilt would be anomalous indeed if
our aspirations toward the ideal of equality under the law caused
us to overlook our disparate human vulnerabilities."'
124
Although it may seem inappropriate to quarrel with a court that
recognizes the unique harm women suffer as a result of rape, 125
the emphasis on women's special "vulnerabilities" poses the
danger that this same characteristic will later be used as a
rationalization for laws that disadvantage women.
126
SICK AND SHIPWRECKED MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES AT SEA 92 (Jean S.
Pictet ed., 1960).
122In analyzing a number of other Geneva Convention provisions designed to
protect pregnant women or mothers of dependent children, Fitzpatrick
similarly concluded that "the maternity-oriented provisions of humanitarian
law.., reflect... rather Victorian views of women as being the equivalent of
children in their weakness and need for special care." Fitzpatrick, supra note
97, at 548. See also Etienne, supra note 42, at 142 & n.20 (referring to People
v. Mario Liberta, 474 N.E.2d 567, 576 (N.Y. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct.
2029 (1985), where the court noted that "the purpose behind [early rape laws]
was to protect the chastity of women and thus their property value to their
father or husbands;" and suggested that the rationale behind the recognition of
rape as a war crime was, similarly, "a way to protect husbands and fathers from
the loss of devaluation of their 'property interests' in their women").
23Country v. Parrat, 684 F.2d 588, 593 (8th Cir. 1981).
'241d. (emphasis added).
1
2SSee id. at 592 (noting that only women can be subjected to the "fear of and,
in some cases, the actuality of an unwanted pregnancy... or be forced to
undergo the physical, emotional, ethical, and financial consequences of such a
pregnancy.").
6For instance, women's "special" health needs were once used to rationalize
limiting women's right to work. See Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421-23
(1908) (upholding a maximum working hours statute which applied only to
women on the grotnds that women needed special protection to safeguard their
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In sum, although intergovernmental and non-
governmental organizations may "'generate pressure and create
constituencies that will encourage the crystallization of a
customary norm prohibiting violence against women,"'' 127 the
international tort of gender violence has not yet reached the
level of universality or definability required to meet the
definition of a customary international norm. As such, it is
unlikely to provide an adequate basis for a successful ATCA
claim. Moreover, even if the gender-specific treaty approach
were successful, the strategy raises deeper, long-term difficulties
for advocates seeking respect for women's rights. The gender-
specific strategy may have the unintended effects of isolating
women's rights cases and aggravating stereotypes that may
eventually work to women's disadvantage.
V. CONCLUSION
Given that perpetrators of human rights abuses are often
shielded from prosecution by their own governments and that
the potential for redress in international fora is hindered by
inadequate resources and lack of political consensus, victims of
human rights and humanitarian law violations face limited
options. Bringing gender-based violence claims as civil suits
under the ATCA remains a valuable tool for those who find
other options unavailable. However, women seeking to be made
whole under the ATCA for rape and other forms of gender-
based violence in situations of conflict face an additional hurdle.
They must either attempt to persuade judges that their
experience of gender-based violence fits within existing, male-
centered norms prohibiting torture, war crimes, crimes against
humanity or genocide, or convince the human rights community
that the prohibition of gender-based violence is a fundamental
and basic tenet which ought to be recognized as a customary
international norm. In light of the fact that all major
health and that of their offspring). The fallout of this "protective legislation"
was to limit the "number of hours women could work, the type of work they
could do, and the conditions under which they could labor." Judith Olans
Brown, Wendy E. Parmet and Phyllis Tropper Baumann, The Failure of
Gender Equality: An Essay in Constitutional Dissonance, 36 BUFF. L. REV.
573, 575-76 (1987).
127 Liebeskind, supra note 58, at 645 (citing Theodor Meron, State
Responsibility and Violence Against Women, in COMBATTING VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN: A REPORT BY THE INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS 47,49 (1993)).
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international human rights fora are currently dominated by
men,128 the task of persuading individual judges that gender-
based violence is tantamount to torture may prove easier than
that of convincing the entire international human rights
community that gender-based violence ought to be
acknowledged as a violation of customary international law.
Although neither the gender-neutral nor the gender-
specific approach is completely satisfactory, the strategy that
will most likely yield women a tangible remedy is bringing the
claim under so-called gender-neutral treaties. Adopting this
strategy may avoid the unintended effects of isolating women's
rights cases and aggravating gender stereotypes that inevitably
flow from the gender-specific approach. On the other hand, the
gender-neutral strategy has the potential of perpetuating the
invisibility of the gender dimension of rape and other forms of
gender-based violence. However, if plaintiffs make use of
storytelling or "oppositional narrative,"' 29 the invisibility of
women's particular experience can be avoided: Through
narrative accounts of the reality of their experiences, victims of
rape or other forms of gender-based violence who bring their
claims under gender-neutral treaties may succeed both in
obtaining tangible monetary damages and countering the
invisibility of women's rights in the international sphere.
128See id. (noting that the "overwhelming majority of U.N. delegates are
male"). "For example, within the United Nations, apart from the Committee
on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women ... there
are a total of 13 women out of 90 'independent experts' on specialist human
rights committees." Charlesworth and Chinkin, supra note 40, at 68 n.29.
Similarly, as of 1995, not one of the sixty judges elected to the Intemational
Court of Justice since 1947 or the 123 members elected to the International
Law Commission since 1949 was a woman. Richard B. Bilder and Martti
Koskenniemi, Book Review, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 227, 227 (1995).
129See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
